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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
          The  trade  liberalization  in  developing  countries  has  been  actively  studied  in  the  last 
decade. A belief that trade liberalization promotes growth has been widely held by economists 
because conventional models predict that openness raises the steady state level of income, and 
many empirical studies support this conjecture although there are many econometric difficulties 
to establish an empirical link between trade liberalization and economic performance. Winters 
(2004) concludes after surveying the recent literature on this issue, e.g. Easterly and Levine 
(2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2004), that the weight of evidence is quite clearly in the direction 
that openness enhances growth. Hence, on the whole the conjecture that trade liberalization 
promotes  growth  seems  true.  However,  the  actual  processes  of  growth  through  trade 
liberalization  do  not  seem  so  clear cut.  For  example,  if  preferences  of  households  are 
heterogeneous across countries, the link between trade liberalization and economic performance 
is  not  as  simple  as  the  case  of  the  identical  preferences  across  countries.  Owing  to  some 
disturbing  factors,  the  actual  processes  of  growth  initiated  by  trade  liberalization  may  not 
proceed on a straight course but be amalgamation of complex processes. The paper studies these 
complex  processes  of  growth  initiated  by  trade  liberalization  in  developing  countries  by 
examining  economic  performances  of  developing  countries  with  and  without  trade 
liberalization. 
          Among many possible disturbing factors, the paper directs its attention to heterogeneity in 
time  preference  rate,  i.e.  a  phenomenon  that  poor  countries  have  the  higher  rate  of  time 
preference, and examines the relation between the higher rate of time preference and strategies 
for trade liberalization in developing countries on the basis of the framework of endogenous 
growth. It has been typically argued that people in poor countries have the higher rate of time 
preference. Importance of this factor is stressed particularly in the literature of environmental 
economics.  Lawrance  (1991)  concludes  that  time  preference  rates  have  a  strong  negative 
correlation with labor income. Cuesta et al. (1997) concludes that there is some evidence of   3 
declining discount rates with increasing income based on empirical research in Costa Rica and a 
review  of  14  other  empirical  studies.
1  Mink  (1993)  suggests  that  an  inherently  short 
time horizon of the poor produces environmental degradation.
2   
          The  reason  why  the  paper  focus  on  the  higher  rate  of time  preference  in  developing 
countries  is  that heterogeneity  in  time  preference rates across  countries makes  international 
transactions  very  complex  and  it  will  play  a  very  important  role  when  trade  liberalization 
policies are executed in developing countries. Becker (1980) argues that the heterogeneous rate 
of  time  preference  results  in  a  misery  consequence  for  people  with  higher  rate  of  time 
preference such that the whole capital is owned by the most patient household, and thus if the 
market of a country with the higher rate of time preference is fully opened, it is conjectured that 
the county loses ownership of the whole capital.   
          The paper commences its analysis starting from the fact that people in poor countries have 
the higher rate of time preference, and thus it is not examined in the paper why the poor has the 
higher rate of time preference. The paper merely examines theoretical consequences of trade 
liberalization when the rates of time preference are heterogeneous across countries. In addition, 
in the model in the paper, the factors that generate the large difference of per capita income 
across countries are put together and described by a single parameter like Parente and Prescott 
(2000). When examining economic performances of developing countries, the large difference 
of per capita income across countries can not be ignored and without considering it the effects 
of trade liberalization on economic performances in developing countries will not be properly 
evaluated. Prescott (1998) argues that the neoclassical growth model accounts for differences 
                                                           
1  The arguments over the reason why the poor has the higher rate of time preference are inconclusive. Pender (1996) 
concludes  that  credit  constraints  are  the  main  reason,  and  some  argue  that  they  have  the  higher  rates  of  time 
preference because they are poor.     
2  The notion that the poor has the higher rate of time preference is implicitly argued in the broader literature of 
sustainable development. See e.g. World Bank (1992).   4 
across  countries  only  if  total  factor  productivity differs  across  countries,  and  that  there  are 
barriers to adopting technologies in developing countries. Another view on this issue is that 
there is a mechanism that makes some developing countries fall into “poverty traps.” Galor 
(1996) and Deardorff (2001) show that a neoclassical growth model provides an explanation for 
a  “poverty  trap,”  “club  convergence,”  or  “twin  peaks”  in  terms  of  specialization  and 
international trade because the model with diverse initial endowments across countries results in 
multiple steady states. To abstract these factors, it is assumed in the paper that the combined 
effects of these factors can be expressed by a single parameter. This parameter is basically same 
as “the efficiency component of TFP” in Parente and Prescott (2000). Using this parameter, an 
endogenous growth model is constructed to extract the effects of higher time preference rate in a 
developing country when the market is opened.   
          Based on the  endogenous growth model, strategies for a developing  country with the 
higher rate of time preference to deal with trade liberalization are examined. One strategy is the 
protection of trade that has been taken in many countries, and another strategy is the free trade. 
In addition, the paper examines a third strategy: the strategy of free trade with wielding market 
power. This strategy is based on the arguments in Sorger (2002) and Ghiglino (2002) to solve 
the problem raised by Becker (1980). They argue that if a country wields her market power, the 
results in Becker (1980) does not hold anymore.           
          The results are previewed as follows. (i) When a developing country is large enough and 
can wield market power, the best strategy for the developing country is generally the strategy of 
free trade with wielding market power, because only this strategy can achieve all the optimality 
conditions and does not distort markets at the same time. This strategy may provide insights into 
the recent trade behavior of China whose economy may be large enough to wield market power. 
The large bilateral current account deficit of the U.S. with China has been persisting. The model 
in the paper predicts that the current account deficit of the U.S. with China will be observed 
generally if the rate of time preference in China is relatively higher than that in the U.S. and if   5 
China is wielding market power. (ii) When a developing country is not large enough and can not 
wield market power, it is very difficult to say which strategy is the best because it is impossible 
for the developing country to wield market power. Nevertheless, the strategy for the developing 
country may be judged not only from the economic but the political point of view, because the 
point  is  whether  the  situation  that  the  whole  capital  is  owned  by  foreigners  is  politically 
acceptable. (iii) There is a third way if small developing countries with similar preferences can 
cooperate and integrate their economies. The integrated economy may be large enough to wield 
combined market power. 
          There may be one criticism to the analysis in the paper that if the higher rate of time 
preference is a result of being poor, the heterogeneity in time preference rate will disappear 
eventually when economies of developing countries grows rapidly owing to opening markets 
and thus examining the link between trade liberalization and heterogeneous impatience across 
countries  is  meaningless.  It  might  be  really  meaningless  if  the  large  difference  between 
developing  and  developed  countries  is  solely  caused  by  trade  protection.  However,  even  if 
markets are opened fully, the large difference between them will remain owing to barriers to 
technology or a mechanism of “poverty trap,” and thus even if markets are perfectly opened the 
heterogeneity in time preference rate remains almost as same as before opening markets because 
the remaining large difference of per capita income makes the heterogeneity of time preference 
rate  remain.  Hence  examining  the  link  between  trade  liberalization  and  heterogeneous 
impatience across countries does not seem meaningless. 
          The paper is organized as follows. In section II, a two country endogenous growth model 
in which international transactions and heterogeneous time preference rates are incorporated is 
built,  and  the  basic  nature  of  the  model  is  examined.  In  section  III,  three  strategies  for  a 
developing country with the higher rate of time preference, i.e. the strategy of free trade without 
wielding market power, the strategy of trade protection, and the strategy of free trade with 
wielding market power, are examined. In section IV, the three strategies are compared with   6 
regard  to  optimality,  market  distortion,  the  level  of  output,  long run  growth  rates,  and  the 
balance on current account, and the best strategy for the country is examined. Finally some 
concluding remarks are offered in section V. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. The basic model 
In most endogenous growth models, the rate of time preference is one of the important 
parameters that determine steady state growth rates. In this sense, many types of endogenous 
growth models in which international transactions are incorporated may be used for the sake of 
the  analysis  in  the  paper  and  may  lead  to  the  same  conclusions.  From  among  various 
endogenous growth models, however, the paper chooses a model that is examined in Harashima 
(2004), because this model has the advantage of being free from both scale effects and the 
influence  of  population  growth.
3  This  advantage  seems  very  important  when  examining 
economies of both developing and developed countries simultaneously because these countries 
have very different demographic features. 
          The production function is assumed to be  ( ) t t t t L K A F Y , , = , where Yt (≥ 0) is outputs, Kt 
(≥ 0) is capital inputs, Lt (≥ 0) is labor inputs, and At (≥ 0) is knowledge/technology/idea inputs 
in period t. The model is based on the following assumptions.   
 
Assumptions:   
(A1) The accumulation of capital and knowledge/technology/idea is  t t t t t δK A ν C Y K − − − = & & , 
where  ( ) 0 > ν   is a constant and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1   of a unit of At are produced using the same 
                                                           
3  See e.g. Jones (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Peretto and Smulders (2002).   7 
amounts of inputs, and  δ   is the rate of depreciation.
4 
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Assumption (A1)  is standard one  in the  literature  of  endogenous  growth. Assumption (A2) 
simply assumes that the number of population and the number of firms in an economy  are 
positively related, which seems intuitively natural. In assumption (A3), the paper assumes that 
returns on investing in Kt and investing in At for a firm are kept equal. In addition, it is also 
assumed in (A3) that a firm that invents a new technology can not obtain all the returns on 
investing in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt but returns of an individual firm that 
invests in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt such that 













∂ 1 1 . The 
reason  why  only  a  fraction  of  the  increase  in  Yt  the  returns  of  an  individual  firm  is,  is 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms.     
          More specifically, the production function is assumed to have the following functional 
form:  ( ) ( ) t t
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=   and  assume  that  ( ) t t L K f ,   is  homogenous  of  degree  one.  Thereby 
( ) t
α




t t t δk k n
L
A ν
c y k − − − − =
&
& .  By  assumptions  (A2)  and  (A3), 
                                                           
4  Hence, like Jones’ (1995) non scale model, At, as well as Kt, is produced less as At and Lt increase if the usual 

























t k f A k f A
mν
α ′ = ⇔
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2. The model in open economies 
          For simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two countries, i.e., country 1 and country 
2 and the parameters as well as population in the two countries are identical except the rate of 
time preference. For simplicity the growth rate of population is assumed to be zero, i.e.,  0 = t n . 
Let the rate of time preference in the country 1 be  1 θ   and that in the country 2 be  2 θ   where 
2 1 θ θ < .  Goods  and  services  and  capital  are  freely  traded  but  labor  is  immobilized  in  each 
country. The production function in the country 1 is  ( ) t
α
t t k f A y 1 1 1 = , and that in the country 2 is 
( ) t
α
t t k f A y 2 2 2 =   where yit is outputs, kit is capital inputs and Ait is knowledge/technology/idea 
inputs  ( ) 2 , 1 = i   in each country. In the paper, only the case of Harrod neutral technological 




it it k A y
− =
1   and thus  ( ) ( ) 2 , 1
1 = =




it it   is examined.
5 
            Because it is presumed that the country 1 is a developed country and the country 2 is a 
developing country, the production of technologies is assumed to be different between two 
countries as follows; 
 
Assumptions:   
(A4) Only the country 1 produces new knowledge/technology/idea inputs, i.e.  0 2 = t A & , and the 
country 2 makes use of knowledge spillovers from the country 1. 
(A5) The level of technology in the country 2 is always lower by  ( ) 1 0 < < q q   than that in the 
                                                           
5  As  is  well  known,  only  Harrod  neutral technological  progress  matches the  stylized facts  presented  by  Kaldor 
(1961).   9 
country  1,  i.e.  t t qA A 1 2 = ,  owing  to  some  kinds  of  obstacles  that  prevent  adopting  higher 
technologies. The parameter q is assumed to be constant. 
 
The parameter q represents the combined effects of factors that generate the large difference of 
per capita income across countries. Various factors have been argued over driving forces that 
generate  the  large  difference.  Prescott  (1998)  argues  that  the  neoclassical  growth  model 
accounts for differences across countries only if total factor productivity differs across countries, 
and that there are barriers to adopting technologies in developing countries. Many economists 
support this view basically and argue that for some reasons e.g. bad social infrastructure, bad 
institutions,  or  resistances  to  new  technologies,  the  total  factor  productivity  in  developing 
countries  is  lower  than  that  in  developed  countries.  For  example,  Hall  and  Jones  (1999) 
conclude that “social infrastructure,” that is an indicator of government anti diversion policies, 
explains much of the differences across countries in output per worker. Another important view 
on  this  issue  is  that  there  is  a  mechanism  that  makes  some  developing  countries  fall  into 
“poverty traps.” Quah (1996) argues that there are “twin peaks” in the empirical distribution of 
national per capita incomes. Galor (1996) and Deardorff (2001) show that a neoclassical growth 
model provides an explanation for a “poverty trap,” “club convergence,” or “twin peaks” in 
terms  of  specialization  and  international  trade  because  the  model  with  diverse  initial 
endowments across countries results in multiple steady states. 
          The parameter q represents the combined effects of these factors and is basically same as 
“the efficiency component of TFP” in Parente and Prescott (2000). However, the paper does not 
ask questions what truly q is and why q is not unity, but simply assumes that q is less than one, 
constant and thus independent of the rate of time preference. That is, while Parente and Prescott 
(2000)  examines  the  characteristics  of  the  efficiency  component  of  TFP  assuming  a 
homogeneous  rate  of  time  preference,  the  paper  examines  instead  the  characteristics  of 
heterogeneous rates of time preference assuming the constant efficiency component of TFP.   10 
          Since both countries are free open economies, returns on investments in both countries are 


























∂ . An increase 
in At enhances outputs in both countries because of knowledge spillovers and thus returns on 

























∂   is always 
held through international arbitration and because  t t qA A 1 2 = , the following equations are held: 
t t k qk 2 1 =   and  t t y qy 2 1 = . Thereby,  ( ) ( )
( ) t
t
t k f mν








= .     
          Here, the balance of payments is introduced in the model. The balance on current account 
in the country 1 is  t τ   and the balance on current account in the country 2 is  t τ − . For the time 
being, it is assumed that each country can not control the sequence of  t τ   and thus  t τ   is treated 
as an exogenous variable in each country. Later in the paper, the model is modified to ones with 
alternative mechanisms of determination of the sequence of  t τ . 
          The optimization problem in the country 1 is; 




































and the optimization problem in the country 2 is; 










t t δk c τ ds τ δ
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& ,     
where  uit( ) 2 , 1 = i is  the  utility  function  in  each  country,  Lt  is  the  population,  and  t A 1 & is  the   11 




mirrors international capital flows owing to current account imbalances, i.e. a country with 






















1   are returns on 
































2   represent  international  income  receipts 




















2   is the balance on goods 



















1   is the balance on goods and services in 
the country 2. Equations (1) and (2) implicitly assume that at t = 0 each country does not have 
any foreign asset.   




it it k A y
− =





it it L A K Y
− =
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∂ ,  the  accumulation  of 























































































 + = ∫
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& .    Hence, 







































































t &    12 
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1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 . 
The optimization problem in the country 1 therefore can be rewritten as   
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1 1
1 & .   
Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
( ) ( ) t θ c u H t 1 1 1 exp − =
( )
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1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1  
where t λ1 is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for the country 1 are   
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1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 & , 
(6)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ → t t t k λ . 
          Since  t t qA A 1 2 =   and thus since  t t k qk 2 1 =   and  t t y qy 2 1 = , the  accumulation of capital 
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 + = ∫
− − .     13 
Hence, similarly, the optimization problem in the country 2 can be rewritten as   
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q k 2 0
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− − & .   
Let Hamiltonian H2 be 

















































t t c τ ds τ δ α
mν
α
q k δ α
mν
α
q t c u H 2 0
1
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 exp λ θ  
where t λ2 is a costate variable, and thus the optimality conditions for the country 2 are   
(7)  ( ) ( ) t
t
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t c τ ds τ δ α
mν
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q k δ α
mν
α
q k 2 0
1




























 + = ∫
− − & , 
(10)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ → t t t k λ . 
 
3. The basic nature of the model 
          Before examining the strategy for trade liberalization in the model, the basic nature of the 
model  is  examined.  To  begin  with,  the  transversality  conditions  are  examined.  Since  the 
problem of scale effects in endogenous growth models is not a focal point in the paper, it is 
assumed for simplicity that t L is sufficiently large and thus  ( )







α q α mL
α mL
t
t   hereafter. 
 
Lemma  1:  The  transversality  conditions  (6)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ → t t t k λ   and  (10)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ → t t t k λ   are  not   14 
satisfied if and only if 
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τ .   
 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
          By lemma 1, an important nature of the model is shown in the following lemma. 
 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = =  constant,  all  the  optimality 
conditions are satisfied. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
III. THREE STRATEGIES 
 
1. The strategy of free trade 
          The strategy of trade liberalization for a developing country is examined in the following 
sections based on the model built above. To begin with, the strategy of free trade is examined. 
Taking lemma 2 into consideration, it is highly likely that rational households in both country 1 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant. However, we must consider, beforehand, how the   15 
sequence of  t τ   is determined. In the well known paper of Becker (1980), it is proved that if 
households  are  purely  price  takers,  the  most  patient  household  owns  all  wealth  in  the 
conventional  Ramsey  models  if  households  have  heterogeneous  rates  of  time  preference. 
Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that under appropriate assumptions the results in Becker 
(1980) still hold in endogenous growth models. Farmer and Lahiri (2004) show that in general, 
balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a multi agent economy except for the special case 
where all agents have the same constant rate of time preference. Their results hold basically in 
this model, which is shown in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: If each country sets  t τ   without regarding the other countries optimality, then if 



















∞ → = = , all the optimality conditions for the representative households in 
the country 2 can be satisfied.   
 
Proof: See Appendix 3.   
 
          At first glance, proposition 1 appears to provide a possibility that the country 2 can escape 



















∞ → = =   is  satisfied. 
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are  exogenously  and  independently  given  as  shown  in  the  proof,  i.e., 







































− 1 1 1
& . Only in extremely lucky 
cases  with  the  combination  of  exogenous  parameters that  satisfies  the  knife edge  condition   16 























2   is satisfied, which will 
be  exceedingly  rare.  As  a  result,  proposition  1  indicates  that  virtually  all  the  optimality 
conditions for a representative household in the country 2 can not be satisfied simultaneously. 
This  result  corresponds  to  the  well known  result  of  Ramsey  models  with  exogenous 
technologies  and  heterogeneous  households  shown  in  Becker  (1980).
6  In  addition,  the 
following corollary shows that the whole capital in the country 2 will be virtually owned by 
foreigners in the long run, which is same as the main conclusion in Becker (1980).   
 
Corollary 1: If each country sets  t τ   without regarding the other countries optimality, then if 












α , the country 2 can not own capital in the long 
run.   
 
Proof: See Appendix 4.   
 
Because the degree of relative risk aversion ε is generally considered to be much larger than 












α   may be satisfied usually.
7 
Hence people in a country with the higher rate of time preference virtually can not own capital 
in the long run.
8  As a result, the consequences of this strategy suggest the necessity of the 
                                                           
6  It is easily shown by modifying the proof of proposition 1 that if there is no heterogeneity in time preference rate 
and thus if  2 1 θ θ = , the optimal growth path requires that the both countries hold  0 = t τ , i.e. the balance on current 
account should be balanced at any time.   
7  As Lucas (1987) argues, the degree of relative risk aversion in the U.S. may be much higher than 1 but less than 20. 
8  It should be noted that even though the households in the country 2 possess no capital, the capital stock in the   17 
second best strategy other than the strategy of free trade. 
          Before going to other strategies, the growth rate and the balance on current account when 
this  strategy  is  taken  are  examined.  Because  the  growth  rates  in  both  country  1  and  2  are 


































1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = , 
then the growth rate in the country 2 is 


































∞ → ∞ →
& & .
9  As 
for  the balance on current account, by (Step 2) in the  proof of proposition  1,  0 > t τ   if  the 
country 2 takes this strategy, i.e. trade deficits in the country 2.   
 
2. The strategy of trade protection 
          Because the strategy of free trade is not optimal for the country 2, the country 2 may take 
some  measures  to  avoid  the  unacceptable  situation  that  emerges  as  a  consequence  of  this 
strategy. A natural choice may be the protection of trade. To examine the strategy of trade 
protection, the model needs to be modified to allow the situation in case of trade protection and 
thus the following assumptions are added. 
 
Assumptions: If the country 2 takes the strategy of trade protection, 
(A6) the balance on current account  t τ   and the inflow of capital are kept zero at any time by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
country 2 is still kept to be  t t qk k 1 2 =   and thus  t t qy y 1 2 = . Point is that all the capital in the country 2 is owned 
by foreigners. 















∞ → ∞ → =   and  equations  (19)  and  (20)  in  Appendix.  See 
Harashima (2004, 2005) for more detailed proofs.   18 
the measures to protect trade in the country 2, 









(A8)  the  country  2  can  utilize  fully  technology  spillovers  from  the  country  1  without 
compensation. 
 
The assumption (A6) symbolizes the measures of trade protection because, if the trade is not 
protected, the country 2 suffers permanent trade deficits that are shown in proposition 1, and in 
this  sense,  the  measures  to  protect  trade  will  be  ones  that  make  trade  deficits  decrease 
significantly. The assumptions (A7) and (A8) are based on the conjecture that if the trade is 
protected, firms in the country 1 can not fully obtain the returns on investing in R&D from the 
country  2,  because,  in  countries  that  protect  trade,  the  protection  of  patent  may  be  also 
insufficient.
10  Under  these  assumptions,  both  countries  grow  as  if  they  are  economically 
independent, i.e. the country 1 grows endogenously and the country 2 grows by exogenously 
given technology shocks that are knowledge spillovers from the country 1. As a result, the 
returns on investments are not necessarily identical in both countries. 
          The optimization problem in the country 1 therefore can be rewritten as   




( ) t t
α
α
t c k δ α
mν
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− & .   
Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
                                                           
10  These assumptions may appear extreme, but they seem to abstract the situation of trade protection sufficiently and 
clarify  well  the  difference  between  the  strategies  of  free  trade  and  trade  protection.  Even  if  more  complicated 
assumptions are introduced, it will not change essential results in the paper but only makes analyses less tractable.   19 
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where t λ1 is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for the country 1 are   
(11)  ( ) ( ) t
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(14)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ → t t t k λ .   

















∂   any  more  owing  to  the 
protection of trade. Because activities of technology progress are carried out only in the country 
1,  the  optimality  problem  in  the  country  2  is  same  as  the  Ramsey  model  with  exogenous 
technology progress. Since  t t qA A 1 2 = , then the accumulation of capital proceeds in the country 
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1
2 1 − − =
−   where  the  technology  t A 1   is  an  exogenous 
variable.            The optimization problem in the country 2 therefore can be rewritten as   
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Let Hamiltonian H2 be 
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where t λ2 is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for the country 2 are   
(15)  ( ) ( ) t
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(18)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ → t t t k λ . 
          Because the technology  t A 1   is an exogenous variable in this optimality problem for the 









2   at steady state by the optimality conditions (15), (16) and (17). The 
technology progress in the country 1 is assumed to be non stochastic and thus smooth, and 









2   holds at any time in the country 2. By this equation, an 
important feature regarding the ratio of output in the country 2 to that in the country 1 is shown 
in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition  2:  When  the  country  2  takes  the  strategy  of  trade  protection,  if 











2 1 , then  t t qy y 1 2 < . 
 
Proof: See Appendix 5. 
 
          This result has two important implications. One is that there is a possibility of  t t qy y 1 2 >  











2 1 ,  i.e.  if  θ2  is  not  so  high.  Thereby,  in  this  case,  the  output  in  the 
country 2 may grow faster initially if the trade is newly protected than that before the trade is 
protected. The other is that if θ2 is higher than a critical point  ( ) δ α
mν





 − 1 1 , the ratio of 
output in the country 2 is lower than that in the country 1. Here, the coefficient of negative   21 




































. If  0 = Π   the output is 
completely reduced by the protection of trade, and if  1 = Π   the output is not reduced by the 









.   
          Next, the growth rate in this modified model is examined. Because the growth rates in 
both country 1 and 2 are determined by the technology progress generated by investments in 
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3. The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
          The strategy of free trade does not achieve optimality but the strategy of trade protection 
distorts markets. Is there a third way for a developing country? Sorger (2002) shows that if a 
government levies a progressive income tax, or if there are few households of each type and 
thus they are not simple price takers but play a Nash equilibrium, the results shown in Becker 
(1980) do not hold anymore. Ghiglino (2002) argues that the latter case in Sorger (2002) can be 
interpreted as a model of international trade with a common market simply by associating each 
household’s type to a country with a national central planner or a representative household.   
                                                           
11  The growth rate is obtained by setting  0 = t τ   in equation (19) in Appendix. See Harashima (2004, 2005) for 
more detailed proofs.   22 
          Based  on  the  arguments  in  Sorger  (2002)  and  Ghiglino  (2002),  in  the  model  of  two 
non small countries with heterogeneous households in the paper, it is possible to assume that 
each representative household in the two countries play a Nash equilibrium with regard to the 
sequence  of  t τ   in  the  optimization  problems  described  in  the  previous  section.  As  Sorger 
(2002) argues, if a household in a country behave as a member of a large group of households 
and know demand functions in markets, the households can wield market power. As a citizen of 
a national, a household may behave considering e.g. the sentiment of “Buy American.” This 
kind of nationalistic behavior may have been widely observed in many countries, and may be 
interpreted as reflecting the behavior of household as a member of a large group of households, 
i.e. households belong and are loyal to a national, a representative household associated with 
whom is playing a Nash equilibrium. 
          If a developing country is large enough like e.g. China or India, it may be possible to 
wield market power against developed countries.
12  In this situation, i.e. if both country 1 and 2 
have market powers each other, it will be possible to assume that households in both countries 
select a sequence of  t τ   and set the initial consumptions so as to achieve a growth path that 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant all the optimality conditions in each country are 
satisfied, which is a condition for a Nash equilibrium. 
          According  to  the  above  arguments,  a  situation  that  representative  households  in  both 
countries have market powers is examined as an alternative strategy for the country 2. It is 
assumed  that  for  the  initial  capital  stocks  20 10 k k =   and  knowledge/technology/idea  A0, 
                                                           
12  If a developing country is not large enough, even combined households in the country are viewed as an atomic 
household and merely a price taker by developed countries, and thus the developed countries will not consider the 
optimality of households in the developing country.       23 
households in both countries select a sequence of  t τ   and set the initial consumptions so as to 
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∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = = = = =
∫
∫
=  a  positive 
constant.
13   
          What should be uncovered firstly is in which country the balance on current account 
shows deficits. The following proposition uncovers that, contrary to the strategy of free trade 
without wielding market power, in many cases the balance on current account in the country 2 
shows surpluses and in reverse that in the country 1 shows deficits if the strategy of free trade 
with wielding market power is taken. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that representative households in both countries have market powers. If 
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2 1 ,  the  balance  on  current  account  in  the 







τ , and that in the 









Proof: See Appendix 6.   
 
                                                           
13  See Harashima (2004, 2005) for more detailed explanations.   24 
Because the degree of relative risk aversion ε is generally considered to be much larger than 











 + − − >
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1   may  be  satisfied 
usually.
14  If it is satisfied, the capital in the country 2 is owned by people in the country 2 
permanently because the balance on current account in country 2 shows surpluses permanently. 














  are  constant,  the  ratio  of  the  balance  on  current  account 
stabilizes in the long run, i.e. the balance on current account does not explode. Nevertheless, to 
conclude more strictly that the balance on current account does not explode, it is necessary to 










  is satisfied. The following corollary shows 










  is satisfied.   
 
Corollary 2: If  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
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Proof: See Appendix 7.   
 
          Finally, like the other strategies, the growth rate when this strategy is taken is examined. 
Because  the  steady  state  growth  rate  in  the  country  1  and  2  is 
                                                           
14  As Lucas (1987) argues, the degree of relative risk aversion in the U.S. may be much higher than 1 but less than 
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∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = = = = =
∫
∫
,  then  the  growth 
rate when the strategy with wielding market power is taken is   
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1. The comparison of strategies 
          The three strategies for a developing country examined above, i.e. the strategy of free 
trade without wielding market power, the strategy of trade protection, and the strategy of free 
trade with wielding market power, bring quite different consequences. The following is the 
comparison of these consequences (See Table). 
 
    (i) The optimality conditions for the country 2   
            The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
                Not satisfied 
            The strategy of trade protection 
                Satisfied 
            The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
                Satisfied 
 
By  proposition  1,  if  the  strategy  of  free  trade  without  wielding  market  power  is  taken, 
households in the country 2 can not achieve the optimality conditions.   26 
 
    (ii) Market distortion   
            The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
                Not distorted 
            The strategy of trade protection 
                Distorted 
            The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
                Not distorted 
 
Protecting trade is a typical type of market distortion. 
 
(iii) Outputs 
            The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
                t t qy y 1 2 =  
            The strategy of trade protection 
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2 1  
            The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
                t t qy y 1 2 =    27 
 
By proposition 2, the ratio of output in the country 2 to that in the country 1 when the strategy 
of trade protection is taken is lower than that when the strategies of free trade both with and 











2 1 . 
 
    (iv) Long run growth rates of output 
            The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
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            The strategy of trade protection 
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            The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
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The highest rate of growth is achieved when the strategy of free trade without wielding market 
power is taken. If  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1
2
1 1 1








































α , and thus if 
( ) [ ] ( ) 1 2












− ,  the  growth  rate  when  the  strategy  of  free  trade  with 
wielding market power is taken is higher than that when the strategy of trade protection is taken, 
and thus the larger the parameter q is, and the lower the rate of time preference in the country 2 
is, the higher the probability that the growth rate is higher when the strategy of free trade with   28 
wielding market power is taken is.   
 
    (v) The balance on current account 
            The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
              Deficits 
            The strategy of trade protection 
              Balanced 
            The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 











 + − − >
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1  











 + − − =
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1  











 + − − <
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1  
 
There features are shown in proposition 1, assumption (A6) and proposition 3.   
 
2. The best strategy 
          According to the above  comparisons,  strategies  for  a developing country that has  the 
relatively higher rate of time preference are evaluated. 
 
  2.1 The country 2 is large enough and can wield market power. 
          In this case, the country 2 has all the three options: the free trade without wielding market 
power, the protection of trade, and the free trade with wielding market power. Among them, 
only the strategy of free trade with wielding market power achieves all the optimality conditions 
and does  not distort  markets  at the  same time.  The  strategy  of  free  trade without wielding   29 
market power can not achieve all the optimality conditions simultaneously and the strategy of 
trade protection distorts markets. In this sense, the best strategy for the country 2 will be the 
strategy of free trade with wielding market power. 
          Although the optimality conditions are not satisfied, the strategy of free trade without 
wielding market power shows the highest long run growth rate and thus the highest long run 
level of output. From this point of view, if households in the country 2 do not care about the 
optimality conditions, they may choose the strategy of free trade without wielding market power. 
Nevertheless, this presumption that households in the country 2 do not care about the optimality 
conditions  means  that  households  in  the  country  2  do  not  behave  rationally,  and  thus  this 
presumption makes no sense if rationality is the most fundamental principle for agents. 
          On the other hand, the growth rate when the strategy of free trade with wielding market 
power is taken is the least one if  ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 2












− . Hence, in this case, the 
levels of output and consumption when this strategy is taken are the least in the long run among 
the three strategies. In this sense, the country 2 that can wield market power may choose the 
strategy of trade protection, even though this strategy makes markets be distorted. The smaller 
the parameter q is, and the higher the rate of time preference in the country 2 is, the more easily 
the condition  ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 2












−   is satisfied. Hence，if a developing country 
has very low q and very high  2 θ , she may tend to choose the strategy of trade protection, even 
though she can wield market power. 
          As a whole, if the country 2 is large enough and does not have so low q nor so high  2 θ , 
and if the households in the country behave rationally, the best strategy is the strategy of free 
trade with  wielding market power.  This  strategy  may  provide  insights  into  the  recent  trade 
behavior of China whose economy may be large enough to wield market power. The large 
bilateral current account deficit of the U.S. with China has been persisting and is a big political   30 
issue between the U.S. and China. The reason why the large bilateral current account deficit of 
the U.S. with China has been persisting has been debated actively and many argue that the 
problem is China's currency manipulation. Probably China’s currency manipulation has truly 
distorted markets significantly and may explain a large part of the deficit of the .U.S. with China, 
but  current  account  imbalances  are  basically  complex  phenomena  and  thus  some  other 
ingredients may also have influence to some extent. The model in the paper shows a possibility 
of another element that if the rate of time preference in China is high compared with the U.S. 
and  if  China  is  wielding  market  power  and  satisfies  the  condition 











 + − − >
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1 ,  the  balance  on  current  account  in  China 
shows surpluses permanently as a result of rational behavior in both countries. Although it is 
merely  a theoretical possibility and may not be  so important compared to China's currency 
manipulation, this possibility may be worth pursuing considering the importance of this issue.   
 
  2.2 The country 2 is not large enough and can not wield market power. 
          In this case, the country 2 has only two options: one is the strategy of free trade without 
wielding market power and the other is the strategy of trade protection, because the country 2 
can not wield market power. However, it is impossible for both strategies to achieve all the 
optimality conditions and not to distort markets at the same time. In this sense, both strategies 
are not satisfactory for households in the country 2. 
          Even apart from criterions of optimality and market distortion, neither strategy seems to 
have  a  decisive  advantage.  If  the  strategy  of  free  trade  without  wielding  market  power  is 
selected, the ratio of output to that in the country 1 and the long run growth rate is higher than 
those when the strategy of trade protection is taken, but in the long run the whole capital in the 
country 2 is owned by foreigners. If the strategy of the trade protection is selected, the whole 
capital is owned by people in the country 2 forever, but because the long run growth rate when   31 
this strategy is taken is lower than that when the strategy of free trade without wielding market 
power is taken, the levels of output and consumption in the country 2 are far lower than those in 
the country 1 and than those when the strategy of free trade without wielding market power is 
taken in the long run, and these gaps continues to widen forever. 
          One way to evaluate the two strategies is to simply compare the expected utilities without 
considering whether these consumption streams satisfy optimality conditions. However, it is 
very difficult to say which strategy provides the higher expected utility for households in the 
country 2, since it is not easy to tract consumption streams analytically. Intuitively, however, 
t τ , i.e. the absolute values of the balance on current account that equals the inflow of capital 
from the country 1 to the country 2 in each period, may not be so large compared to the output, 
and if so, the expected utility when the strategy of free trade without wielding market power is 
taken will be higher than that when the strategy of trade protection is taken, because the output 
in the near future when the strategy of free trade without wielding market power is taken will be 
roughly identical to the consumption and thus the consumption in the near future when the 
strategy of free trade without wielding market power is taken will be higher than that when the 
strategy of trade protection is taken.   









,  as  2 θ   becomes  higher,  the  negative 
impacts of trade protection becomes larger. In these cases, the damage of trade protection in the 
near  future  will  be  much  larger  and  thus  the  expected  utility  when  the  strategy  of  trade 
protection is taken may be smaller than that when the strategy of free trade without wielding 
market  power  is  taken.  Hence  the  higher  the  rate  of  time  preference  2 θ   is,  the  higher  the 
probability that the expected utility when the strategy of free trade without wielding market 
power is taken is higher may be. 











2 1   and thus there   32 
is a possibility that if the trade is newly protected the output in the country 2 may be higher and 
grow faster initially than that before the trade is protected. In this case, the consumption in the 
near future will be also higher than that that is possible if markets remain open. Taking these 
effects into consideration, the expected utility may be higher if the trade is newly protected than 











2 1 . 
          As a whole, unless a developing country has the very high rate of time preference, it is not 
easy to say which strategy provides the higher expected utility. Nevertheless, the criterion of the 
expected utility dose not have overwhelming power because the optimality conditions are not 
satisfied if the strategy of free trade without wielding market power is taken. The crucial point 
seems rather how the situation that the whole capital is owned by foreigners is evaluated when 
the  government  of  the  country  2  makes  the  decision  which  strategy  should  be  taken.  This 
problem  for  the  government  may  not  be  solved  by  purely  an  economical  criterion,  i.e.  the 
maximization of expected utilities, but its solution may be judged partially from the political 
point of view. Politically a government may not accept the situation that the whole capital is 
owned by foreigners because the government may consider “national economic security” or the 
pride of the nation that may be hurt by “economical occupation” by foreigners. Anyway, it may 
be a hard choice for the country 2. 
 
  2.3 The third way 
          Is there no other way for a developing country with the higher rate of time preference if 
she  has  no  market  power?  A  possible  alternative  way  is  that  small  countries  with  similar 
preferences cooperate, integrate their economies and wield a combined market power. If these 
countries  can  successfully  integrate  their  economies,  this  integrated  economy  may  be  large 
enough to wield market power, and thus can choose the strategy of free trade with wielding 
market power, which is basically better than the other strategies for the developing countries.   33 
FTA among these countries may be a way to integrate their economies, although many political 
problems still need to be overcome. 
 
3. The interaction between q and the strategies 
          Finally, the interaction between q and the strategies is considered briefly. The model in 
the paper concentrates on heterogeneity of time preference rates across countries and abstracts 
other factors by introducing a parameter q, and implicitly assumes that q and the strategies are 
independent each others. However, the value of the parameter q may not be independent of the 
choice  of  strategy  and may be  changed  by  strategies.  For example,  if  the  strategy  of  trade 
protection  is  taken,  the  competition  in  domestic  markets  may  be  somewhat  restricted,  e.g. 
domestic markets are dominated by a few domestic companies, and thus technology inflows 
from  developed  countries  may  be  much  more  obstructed.  As  a  result,  the  strategy  of  trade 
protection may have much larger negative impacts on output.   
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
          In general the conjecture that trade liberalization promotes growth seems true. However, 
the actual processes of growth initiated by trade liberalization do not seem so clear cut. The 
paper studies complex processes of growth through trade liberalization in developing countries. 
It has been typically argued that people in poor countries have the higher rate of time preference, 
and the paper directs its attention to this fact and examines the relation between the higher rate 
of time preference and strategies of trade liberalization for developing countries on the basis of 
the framework of endogenous growth. 
          The paper starts its analysis from the fact that poor countries have the higher rate of time 
preference, and thus it is not examined in the paper why the poor has the higher rate of time 
preference. In addition, the combined effects of factors that generate the large difference of per   34 
capita  income  across  countries,  e.g.  barriers  to  technology  adoption,  are  put  together  and 
expressed by a  single  parameter  in the  model. Based on a two country endogenous growth 
model, strategies for a developing country with higher rate of time preference to deal with trade 
liberalization are examined. The results are summed up as follows. 
(i) When a developing country is large enough and can wield market power, the best strategy for 
the  developing  country  is  generally  the  strategy  of  free  trade  with  wielding  market  power 
because only this strategy can achieve all the optimality conditions and does not distort markets 
at the same time.   
(ii) When a developing country is not large enough and can not wield market power, it is very 
difficult to say which strategy is the best for the developing country because it is impossible for 
the developing country to wield market power. Nevertheless, the strategy for the developing 
country  may  be  judged  not  only  from  the  economic  but  political  point  of  view  because  a 
government in the country must decide whether the situation that the whole capital is owned by 
foreigners is politically acceptable.   
(iii) There is a third way if small developing countries with similar preferences can cooperate 
and integrate their economies. The integrated economy may be large enough to wield combined 
market power. FTA among these countries may be a way to integrate their economies, although 
many political problems still need to be overcome. 
          The strategy of free trade with wielding market power that is generally the best strategy 
for a developing country when the developing country is large enough may provide insights into 
the recent trade behavior of China whose economy may be large enough to wield market power. 
The large bilateral current account deficit of the U.S. with China has been persisting. The model 
in the paper predicts that the current account deficit of the U.S. with China will be generally 
observed if the rate of time preference in China is relatively higher than that in the U.S. and if 
China  is  wielding  market  power.  It  is  merely  a  theoretical  possibility  and  may  not  have 
important influence compared to China’s currency manipulation. Many empirical researches are   35 
necessary to conclude that this mechanism has really worked and has had influence to some 
extent.  However,  considering  the  importance  of  this  issue,  this  possibility  may  be  worth 
pursuing.   
   36 
APPENDIX 
 
1. Proof of lemma 1 
(Step 1) By the optimality condition (5),   
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On the other hand, by the optimality condition (4), 
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.   
(Step 2) By the optimality condition (9),     37 
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. 
On the other hand, by the optimality condition (8), 
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.   
          Hence,  the  transversality  conditions  (6)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ → t t t k λ   and  (10)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ → t t t k λ   are  not 
satisfied if and only if 
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τ .   
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
2. Proof of lemma 2 
(Step 1) By the optimality conditions (3), (4) and (5), 
(19) 

















































































Similarly, by the optimality conditions (7), (8) and (9), 
(20) 

















































































In addition,   



























































































































































































































τ& & & . Thus, by 
lemma 1 the transversality conditions (6) and (10) are satisfied, and also all the other optimality   39 
conditions are satisfied. 







































τ& . Thus by lemma 1, for both 














































∞ → ∞ → ≠ , the 
transversality conditions (6) or (10), or the optimality conditions (5) or (9) is violated. 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant, all the optimality 
conditions are satisfied. 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
3. Proof of proposition 1 
(Step 1) In this case,  t τ   can be seen as a control variable for each country in each country’s     
optimization problem. Hence, the optimality condition 


































is added to the optimality conditions for the country 1, and the optimality condition   


































is added to the optimality conditions for the country 2. The optimality conditions (23) and (24) 









































q   and  thus  the   40 
optimal  consumption  growth  rates  are 
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          On the other hand, by the optimality conditions (23) and (24), 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1
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∞ → =   for the optimality conditions 















∞ → =   for 
the optimality conditions (7), (8), (9) and (10) to be satisfied. 
        Here, because the equations such that  t t k qk 2 1 = ,  t t y qy 2 1 =   are kept by firms at any time, 
the households in the country 2 must set the higher initial consumption level than that in the 
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∞ → ∞ → = < .   41 










  and thus the optimality condition (7) or (24) is 
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1 , and thus the ratio of  t τ   to 
t c1   diminishes to zero as time passes and the balance on current account becomes negligible for 















∞ → = , thereby it is 



















































∞ → = = , it is possible for the country 2 to satisfy all the optimality conditions 
by setting appropriate initial values of  10 c   and  0 τ . 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
4. Proof of corollary 1 















∞ → = .  Since 
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∞ → > ,  then 
the whole capital must be owned by foreigners in the long run because  t τ   is an increase of 
capital owned by foreigners in period t by assumption. 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
   42 
5. Proof of proposition 2 





A 1 1 1−
= , then at the steady state 











































































and   
( )
































































































2 1 , then  t t qy y 1 2 < .   
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
6. Proof of proposition 3 
(Step 1) Because current account imbalances grow at the same rate with output, consumption, 
or capital eventually, the  ratio of the balance on current account to output approaches to a 
unique finite constant value. 















∞ → ∞ → = , then by equations (19) and (20),   
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= a positive constant. 

















































































= a positive constant.   





































1 lim lim lim lim
& & & , 





















































1 1 lim  


























































































1 1 lim & &
&
   44 
( ) ( )
























































































1 lim 1 1 lim
&

























































= a positive constant. 
          Here, 





















































∞ → ∞ → ∞ →
& &
& & .  Thereby,  if 
( ) ( )







































  and thus if 











 + − − >
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2
2 1 , then 










































.  Hence,  because 
























































 + − − >
+ − 1 1 1 1 1
2








=  a 
















                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
7. Proof of corollary 2 










































lim lim lim lim lim lim
& & & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = =
∫
∫
  and   45 





















































∞ → ∞ → ∞ →
& &


















1 lim lim lim
& & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = =






















(Step 2) By equations (25),   
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Table: Summary of the three strategies for the country 2 
                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                  Free trade without        Trade protection        Free trade with   
                                              wielding market power                                  wielding market power 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 The optimality conditions            Not satisfied                    Satisfied                    Satisfied 
 The market distortion                  Not distorted                    Distorted                Not distorted   
 The ratio of output to                            q                                  q >                              q   











2 1  
                                                                q                                  q <                              q 











2 1  
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